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Politically and militarily, the War in the Gulf remains an unsettled event. 
Although nearly two years have passed since the War, its political conse- 
quences are still evolving. Militarily, the recent reintroduction of allied 
forces into Iraqi air space suggests that the War continues, though at a much 
reduced level.1 In the long run, the War will probably be seen as a footnote 
to the larger political upheavals that marked the start of this decade-note- 
worthy because it made visible the realignment of the international order 
that had already occurred. 
While the War may be merely a footnote from the perspective of political 
history, it is a major event from the perspective of international law. It 
marked one of the few occasions on which there was a deliberate invocation 
of international aw to justify military force. For this reason, an examination 
of the War can teach us much about the reality of, and possibilities for, 
international law. Given the continuing tumultuous politics of Eastern Eu- 
rope and the former Soviet Union, this legal reconsideration is important. 
Already, the international-legal machinery deployed in the War has served 
as a precedent for United Nations Security Council action authorizing mili- 
tary intervention in Bosnia and Hercegovina.2 
We are moving rapidly toward a new world order of some sort. While it 
may be too early to predict the political shape of that order, it is not too 
early to consider the role that international law may play in it. Before we 
raise our hopes for a vital future for international law, we need to fully un- 
derstand the character and power of existing international aw. To that end, 
it is useful to examine international aw as it operated, and failed to operate, 
in the Gulf War. 
The international law at work during the Gulf War is the captive of an 
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1. See, e.g., John Lancaster, Allies Declare "No Fly Zone" in Iraq, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1992, 
at Al. 
2. The U.N. Security Council authorized states "to take ... all measures necessary to facilitate 
... delivery ... of humanitarian assistance to ... Bosnia and Hercegovina." Statement Authorizing 
Intervention in Bosnia and Hercegovina, U.N. SCOR, -Sess.,- mtg. at-, U.N. Doc. S/PV- 
(Aug. 13, 1992) (on file with the Stanford Law Review). 
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ideal of state sovereignty that assumes a harmonious relationship between a 
people and its government. All too often, however, the reality is not har- 
mony but opposition. In its present form, international aw cannot deal with 
this reality. Its focus on the ideal of state sovereignty leads international aw 
to pursue morally unsupportable goals and to choose irrational means. 
When the international legal system acts to protect state sovereignty, too 
often the only real beneficiary is the political leadership, not the people. In 
those rare cases when modern international aw responds to legal violations, 
it ends up punishing the people for the acts of their leaders, when the people 
too are victims. 
While at some deep level international law has grasped that it will re- 
main a tool of powerful interests of the status quo until it rests on a founda- 
tion of human rights, justice, and equality, these ideals are not yet operative 
aspects of the legal system. Until the international legal system embraces 
these ideals, the new world order must seek a foundation somewhere outside 
of international law. 
These may seem overly pessimistic conclusions to draw from the defeat 
of Saddam Hussein's effort at international aggrandizement. Admittedly, 
the enterprise of drawing general lessons for international aw from a single 
event is inherently controversial. Moreover, analysis of the Gulf War is par- 
ticularly difficult because the events have a complicated sequential character. 
The lessons drawn depend not only upon the particular events one empha- 
sizes, but equally upon where one ends the story. For example, although the 
immediate aftermath of the war was a human rights disaster for Iraqi Kurds 
and Shiites, that disaster elicited an international response that is itself an 
ongoing story. 
Despite such problems, international legal analysis must look to single 
events. This is true because particular incidents of state behavior are an 
important source of innovation in international aw.3 More important, only 
by looking to the operation of law in particular events are we able to discuss 
realistically the force and effect of the formal system of international law.4 
Discussion of international law, particularly the law of war, always oc- 
curs within a context generated by a single, overwhelming question: Is inter- 
national law really law at all? Although international lawyers believe they 
have answered this question countless times, the truth is that international 
law can no more escape this question than constitutional law can escape the 
question of the legitimacy of judicial review. These questions define the en- 
terprises: They reveal the deep ambivalence we feel about the ties between 
legal institutions and the political order. Analysis of the Gulf War shows 
that this ambivalence permeates the very norms of international law. 
Because the War was a complex event spread out over many months, 
3. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. XXXVIII, ? 1 (listing "in- 
ternational custom" as a source of international law). 
4. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN & ANDREW R. WILLARD, INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE 
LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS (1988). 
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three different perspectives on the role of international law will assist the 
analysis. We can look to the role of law in the actions leading up to the War, 
in the conduct of the War, and in the aftermath of the War. Together, these 
perspectives illustrate how moder international law manages (or fails to 
manage) a crisis. 
I. GOING TO WAR 
From the perspective of international law, rather than U.S. policy, the 
War did not begin on January 16, 1991 with the initiation of the bombing 
campaign; rather, it started on August 2, 1990 when Iraqi troops crossed 
Kuwait's border. Undeniably, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait represented a mas- 
sive failure of international aw. Whatever Iraq might have said about Ku- 
wait being a province of Iraq, no one can deny that sending the Iraqi army 
across the internationally recognized border of Kuwait was a violation of the 
first and most evident principle of moder international aw. This principle 
is set down in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter: "All members shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . ."5 
The Iraqi invasion marked the first time that one U.N. member state 
attempted to use military force to obliterate the sovereignty of another mem- 
ber state. Although states have, of course, regularly intervened in the do- 
mestic affairs of other sovereign states, they have not aimed to terminate 
sovereignty through annexation. Kuwait and Iraq may indeed have had a 
longstanding territorial dispute,6 but modern international law rests on the 
premise that states are to seek resolution of their disagreements through 
peaceful means rather than recourse to force.7 
Iraq's actions resembled those common throughout the pre-United Na- 
tions international legal system, in which force was regularly used to change 
territorial boundaries. In that system, war was a legitimate way to change 
legal relationships, including geographic borders.8 The modern system of 
international law, represented in the U.N. Charter, insists that changes in 
the existing legal regime can arise only through peaceful mechanisms that 
rest ultimately on the consent of sovereign states. Accordingly, Chapter VI 
of the Charter, on "pacific settlement of disputes," allows the Security Coun- 
cil to do no more than "recommend" procedures for and terms of settle- 
ment.9 Chapter VII which allows the Security Council to take coercive 
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, T 4. 
6. On the history of the territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, see RICHARD N. SCHO- 
FIELD, KUWAIT AND IRAQ: HISTORICAL CLAIMS AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES (1991). 
7. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, ? 3 ("All members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means ... ."). 
8. See LASA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW ? 241a (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948): 
The recognition of title by conquest was, prior to the Covenant of the League, the Charter 
of the United Nations, and the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, the necessary 
result of the admissibility of the right of war as an instrument both for enforcing the law 
and for changing existing rights. 
9. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38. 
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action, envisions such action only "to maintain or restore international peace 
and security."10 The Charter authorizes action, in other words, only when 
there has been, or is about to be, a violent breach of the legal status quo. 
Changes brought about by a unilateral use of force are, therefore, no longer 
entitled to legal recognition.11 
Although it shocked many international lawyers, Iraq's August invasion 
at least shed the ordinary patina of hypocrisy associated with state uses of 
force in the modern era. The manipulation of legal rhetoric had already 
corrupted the modern international legal system. Iraq's lawlessness brought 
us face-to-face with this corruption. That Iraq could have even invaded Ku- 
wait represents the failure of international law, as of August 1990, to provide 
a substantial restraint on the use of military power to create a regional, hege- 
monic position. Surely this was not new. What was new was Iraq's disre- 
gard of the rhetoric of international law. 
While violations of international law's prohibition on the use of force 
have been frequent in the modern era, they have generally been accompanied 
by efforts at legal justification. These asserted justifications have ranged 
from "invitations" to intervene, to "collective" decisions by regional organi- 
zations, to simple denials of responsibility for "covert" actions.12 Rarely 
have these justifications and excuses been anything more than pretexts for 
aggression. At best, they have provided a weak acknowledgment of the pres- 
ence of an international legal system that forbids the employment of force 
against a sovereign state. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait teaches that the reality 
of unilateral state intervention provided a stronger rhetoric, to all but the 
lawyers, than the covering rhetoric of international law. 
Moreover, Iraq had good reasons to believe it could safely disregard both 
the form and substance of international law. When had the international 
community expended substantial resources to protect the sovereignty of one 
of its members? Looking to the moder history of the Middle East, Iraq 
would have found very little evidence that the international behavior of 
states was subject to an effective regime of law. The world stood by when 
Iraq invaded Iran. Indeed, it is now clear that the United States and a 
number of its allies actually assisted Iraq in that war as early as the Spring of 
1982.13 Similarly, while the international community may have called the 
10. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. 
11. An early, and unsuccessful, effort to formulate this position was the Doctrine of Nonrecog- 
nition, proposed by Secretary of State Stimson in 1932 (the "Stimson Doctrine"), which would have 
refused to recognize "any situation . . . which may be brought about contrary to the covenants and 
obligations of the Pact of Paris." J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 172 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963). The Pact of 
Paris (1928), in turn, purported to make illegal "recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies." Id. at 409. 
12. This was seen in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (in response to an alleged "invita- 
tion"); the U.S. intervention in Grenada (based allegedly on both a collective decision of the Organi- 
zation of Eastern Caribbean States as well as an invitation); and the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua 
(repeated denials of responsibility for covert actions). 
13. See Seymour M. Hersh, U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War Against Iran, N. Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, at Al ("The Reagan Administration secretly decided to provide highly classi- 
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Syrian and Israeli military interventions in Lebanon illegal, both countries 
still occupy substantial portions of Lebanese territory. The international 
community had also failed to take any practical action to force Israel to 
change its policy of occupation and annexation of the territories captured in 
the 1967 war. In sum, international law, beyond an occasional rhetorical 
flourish, was not an effective rule of action in the Middle East. 
On all sides of disputes in the Middle East, force, not law, has deter- 
mined behavior. Success and failure have been determined on the ground 
and in the streets, not in the legal institutions of the international system. 
Quite simply, formal condemnation of international law violations has not 
counted for much. Iraq would have easily tolerated this foreseeable cost. 
Expanding the horizon of international behavior, Iraq could again have 
reasonably concluded that the world was quite willing to tolerate military 
intervention by regional powers. The list of violations of Article 2(4) is long 
indeed. For example, in this hemisphere, recent years have seen forceful 
U.S. interventions in Nicaragua, Panama, and Grenada. Around the world, 
examples include the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, not to mention 
its earlier interventions in Eastern Europe, China's intervention in Vietnam, 
Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, and South Africa's interventions in 
Angola and Mozambique. All of these actions raise the possibility that the 
Charter's grand vision of international law, expressed most clearly in Article 
2(4), suffered an early death.14 
Iraq's action was more dramatic in appearance than the previous exam- 
ples in that it denied Kuwait sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is difficult to ar- 
gue that the international community had, in the period since the end of 
World War II, established the principle of nonuse of force as a practical 
constraint on interstate relations. The events of the summer of 1990 demon- 
strate the dimensions of the failure of the international law project of the 
modern era. What was aberrational about those events was the world's re- 
sponse, not Iraq's action. But a unique response cannot change the place of 
law in the international order overnight. The Gulf War is, above all, a story 
of international law's failure, not of its success. 
Moreover, before international lawyers go too far in their celebration of 
the collective response to Iraq's aggression, they should assess realistically 
exactly where Saddam Hussein made his mistake. His was a political, not a 
legal mistake. Put bluntly, Saddam Hussein was too greedy. The strategic 
nightmare for the United States would have been for Saddam Hussein to 
have pulled out of Kuwait completely, except for a narrow strip of land 
along the border and the two Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubiyan. This 
strip, of course, contains most of Kuwait's oil. Obtaining the islands would 
also have secured Iraq's outlet to the Gulf. Moreover, these areas were at 
fied intelligence to Iraq in the spring of 1982-more than two years earlier than previously dis- 
closed-while also permitting the sale of American-made arms to Baghdad in a successful effort to 
help President Hussein avert imminent defeat in the war with Iran."). 
14. See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970). 
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the center of the historical dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. These territo- 
ries are what many observers believed to be the strategic goals of Iraq.15 
Nevertheless, it is inconceivable that the United States could have mobilized 
an international coalition, or even substantial domestic support, for military 
action to respond to what would have been seen as merely a new twist in a 
longstanding border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. In fact, it is doubtful 
that the United States could have mobilized even a nonmilitary response. 
The world, I suspect, would have been willing to tolerate a good deal of 
lawless behavior even in this instance. There is a lesson in political modera- 
tion to be found here, as much if not more than a lesson in law. 
If Iraq's actions in going to war demonstrate international law's failure 
in the modern order, the international response provides a counter-study in 
the possibilities for law. The moder system of international aw emerged in 
response to the extreme levels of state violence that marked the first half of 
this century. The goal of post World War II international law was not just 
to regulate the conduct of war, but to end war altogether.16 Interstate vio- 
lence under the new system was to be either a violation of law or the sanc- 
tion of law in response to a prior violation. Crucial to this legal system is the 
operation of collective decisionmaking by international institutions acting 
under legal standards. Yet for most of the modern era, those institutions 
have failed to act. Because the formal system of law did not coincide with 
the political interests of the major powers, international law's formal prohi- 
bition against the use of force remained, for the most part, an unrealized 
ideal. 17 
By going to the United Nations and following the procedures for collec- 
tive decisionmaking set forth in the Charter, the United States built an inter- 
national law framework for its actions. While there was ample recent 
precedent for Iraq's disregard of international law, one must go back to the 
Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis to find adequate precedents for 
the United States' decision to mobilize the institutions of international aw to 
support a recourse to force. Security Council action in the former case, and 
OAS action in the latter, converted interstate violence and the threat of vio- 
lence into the positive expression of an international legal regime. The same 
was true in this case: Force was linked to law through an international deci- 
sionmaking mechanism.'8 
15. See Theodore Draper, The Gulf War Reconsidered, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 16, 1992, at 46, 
47-48. 
16. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. ("We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war ...."). 
17. The symbol of this mismatch between international law and politics was the complete fail- 
ure to act on Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, which imagined an institutionalization of military 
power within the United Nations, to provide an effective international sanctioning mechanism. 
18. To appreciate the unusual character of the U.S. action in this case, we might compare it to 
the long policy of secret, unilateral intervention in Nicaragua or to the strained legal arguments in 
support of intervention in Grenada and Panama. For a discussion of the conflict in Grenada, see 
Francis A. Boyle, International Lawlessness in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1984). On Panama, 
see Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under International Law, 84 
AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990). 
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From the perspective of creating an effective international legal regime, 
the United States' action with respect to Iraq is particularly praiseworthy 
because a strong argument could have been made in support of unilateral 
action under Article 51 of the Charter. That Article recognizes a right of 
self-defense and, more importantly, of collective self-defense "until the Se- 
curity Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security."19 Arguably, the United States could have defended Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia merely upon a request from their governments. This ex- 
ception for a unilateral recourse to force in "self-defense" has provided a 
large loophole through which much of the hope for the prohibition on the 
use of force in Article 2(4) has fallen over the last few decades. Yet another 
unilateral use of force, justified by reference to Article 51, would have done 
little to advance international aw from a self-serving rhetorical system to an 
actual restraint on the behavior of states. 
Discussions of international law tend to fade into discussions of the do- 
mestic law of foreign policy. This is inevitable for two reasons. First, we are 
interested not just in the formal system of international aw but in how inter- 
national law interacts with domestic legal institutions. Second, international 
law and constitutional law both address the problem of creating institutional 
constraints on the unilateral use of force in international affairs.20 Interna- 
tional law and domestic separation of powers doctrine share the goal of re- 
straining the use of force through the dispersion of authority and the 
requirement of collective decisionmaking. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
Gulf War triggered renewed debate over the constitutional division of re- 
sponsibility for decisions to use force: Does Congress' war-making power 
require it to review military actions taken by the President as commander in 
chief?21 
Just as there is a danger in looking only to the international response to 
Iraq's action and not to that action itself in evaluating the contemporary 
status of international law, so too is there a danger in looking only to Con- 
gress' ultimate approval of the President's actions, rather than its initial fail- 
ure to act at all, in evaluating the constitutional dimensions of the problem. 
In truth, the Gulf War reveals more about congressional impotence than 
about joint executive and legislative responsibility for foreign policy. 
In recent history, Congress has repeatedly failed to effectively check ex- 
ecutive decisions to use force.22 Congress' behavior in the Gulf War con- 
firms that pattern. Congress allowed itself to be manipulated by the 
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
20. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 72-81 (1991); HAROLD 
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN- 
CONTRA AFFAIR 67-100 (1990). 
21. These issues took legal form in Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990), a 
lawsuit by several members of Congress who requested an injunction to prevent President Bush from 
initiating an offensive attack against Iraq without first securing Congressional authorization. The 
court determined that the controversy was not ripe for judicial decision. Id. at 1152. 
22. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Les- 
sons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988). 
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President, who was able to control both the agenda and the calendar. If 
Congress was to act effectively, it needed to act early-October or November 
at the latest. During this period, however, there was no congressional pol- 
icy. Instead, there was a conscious effort by congressional leadership to 
avoid taking a position. Congress thereby allowed the President to build up 
U.S. forces and create a major confrontation with Saddam Hussein without 
subjecting those policy choices to public scrutiny and articulate critique. In- 
deed, the entire November election passed without a serious public evalua- 
tion of these policies. When the President finally turned to Congress for 
support, Congress found itself in a position where any attempt to constrain 
U.S. military policy would have seemed like a concession to Iraq. 
The lesson that constitutional theorists should learn from this is that 
Congress, in an age in which the President effectively controls much of the 
media, is not likely to provide the constraint on military action for which the 
Founders had hoped when they placed the war-making power in Congress' 
hands.23 In truth, decisions to use military force are usually quite popular. 
No President is likely to suffer politically from a successful use of force, even 
if it violates international aw. The President has a unique capacity to mobil- 
ize popular support and to lead the country in these situations. Congress 
does not, at those moments, have the political strength to say no to the Presi- 
dent. Indeed, the lesson that Congress may have learned from the military 
success of Desert Storm is that it is extremely risky to oppose the President 
on decisions to use force. Military action becomes unpopular only when it 
goes badly. By that time, congressional action is usually too little and too 
late. 
In the Gulf War, both sets of institutional authorities-domestic and in- 
ternational-acted on and approved the use of force in response to Iraq's 
invasion. International institutions were strengthened by their actions, but 
Congress was not strengthened in its ongoing struggle with the President. 
This conclusion is supported by more recent events. In the past year, the 
President has threatened to use force in what was formerly Yugoslavia and 
has reintroduced American combatants into Iraq. Neither policy was de- 
bated or acted upon by the Congress. In the former instance, however, the 
President did seek United Nations' approval of possible military 
intervention. 
The larger lesson is that if there is to be an effective institutional means of 
constraining military adventurism, at least by the United States, it must be 
located in the international arena. The danger of the "new" world order is 
that it will simply replace a system of two superpowers with that of a single 
superpower. If that comes to pass, the most pressing need of the new order 
will be to devise mechanisms to constrain the use of military force by U.S. 
Presidents. In this context, the Gulf War is useful as a paradigm of what 
23. The lesson President Bush drew from this experience seems to have been that he did not 
need congressional approval for his use of force in the Gulf: "It was argued I can't go to war 
without the Congress. And I was saying, I have the authority to do this." 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
Doc. 284 (Mar. 10, 1991). 
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international aw requires before a country, including the United States, can 
use military force against another country. That it has served this role in the 
development of policy with respect to the conflict in Bosnia is a hopeful sign. 
That it will continue to be an effective paradigm is, at least, doubtful. 
The circumstances that allowed the United States to muster international 
support for its military action in the Gulf were quite exceptional. Both the 
Soviet Union and China were so preoccupied with their own domestic 
problems, and with their relations with the West, that they were unwilling to 
exercise their veto power in the U.N. Security Council to defend a former 
client state. In addition, European and Third World dependence on Middle 
Eastern oil contributed to Iraq's isolation in the international arena. While 
these particular circumstances made the international cooperation in the 
Gulf War both attractive and plausible, this confluence of events is unlikely 
to repeat itself in the future. Even in this case, the United States still had to 
mobilize massive political and economic resources to achieve the desired re- 
sults at the United Nations.24 Thus, the experience of the Gulf War offers 
little reason to hope that the United States (or any other state) will choose a 
less compliant multinational decisionmaking process over a unilateral re- 
course to force if national security interests are threatened in the future. In 
this respect, the most telling fact about recent international actions with re- 
spect to Bosnia may be that despite the Security Council action, no country 
has yet had sufficient motivation to intervene. 
In the end, the use of force in the Gulf War teaches first a lesson of the 
failure of international aw and then a lesson of the potential of international 
law. The failure reflects the dominant pattern of modern international af- 
fairs-a unilateral recourse to force without regard to legal constraints. The 
positive response of the international community, however, is one of a lim- 
ited number of successful efforts at collective decisionmaking under the U.N. 
Charter. To interpret this response as the beginning of a new respect for 
international law is, I am afraid, far too optimistic. 
II. THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 
Just as Iraq disregarded international aw by invading Kuwait, it showed 
little respect for international laws governing warfare.25 The conduct by 
both sides, however, demonstrates the inadequacies of the current interna- 
tional law of warfare. First, the legal system failed to deter Iraq from com- 
mitting massive human rights abuses. Second, basic tenets of international 
law, such as proportionality of military response, failed to provide any real 
limits on allied action. Third, and most important, compliance with the in- 
24. See Theodore Draper, The True History of the Gulf War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 30, 1992, 
at 38, 41. 
25. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE 
PERSIAN GULF WAR-APPENDIX ON THE ROLE OF THE LAW OF WAR, Apr. 10, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 
612 (1992) [hereinafter DoD REPORT]. 
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ternational law of warfare does not in itself minimize the human suffering 
that attaches to war. 
During the Gulf War, Iraq violated various provisions of the 1949 Ge- 
neva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war and on the treatment 
of civilians in occupied territories. Iraq's taking of foreigners as hostages, its 
seizure of Kuwaiti civilians, its systematic looting of the country, its massive 
human rights violations within Kuwait, and its treatment of allied prisoners 
of war all violated the most basic of international law norms. Is anyone 
surprised by this? Where would Iraq have learned the habits of legality? 
The international community has failed to create an environment in 
which the rule of law functions as a general norm by which to measure state 
behavior. The Middle East has been a lawless, violent place. Saddam Hus- 
sein's behavior within Iraq has not been significantly different from the be- 
havior of surrounding regimes, including Syria, Iran, and even Israel in 
many respects. In these states, the concern for human rights, self-determina- 
tion, and principles of justice-ideals necessary to support any legitimate 
legal system-are simply absent from governmental policy. 
It is unrealistic to expect regimes that do not adhere to a rule of law in 
their domestic policies to do so internationally. Although tactical interests 
may dictate compliance with international law, that depends on the ever- 
changing political and military circumstances. The mere fact that a rule is a 
product of law does not give it independent or additional weight for these 
regimes. Law is either a habit of governance or it is not. In the Middle East, 
it is not. 
Interestingly, the one rule of warfare which Iraq appeared to abide by 
was that on the nonuse of chemical weapons.26 The lesson may be that reci- 
procity is still the most effective enforcement mechanism for the rules of 
warfare. Iraq must have feared that it would have suffered massive retalia- 
tion had it used chemical weapons. In particular, if it had used chemical 
weapons against Israel, Iraq could realistically have feared not simply a re- 
ciprocal use of gas, but also an Israeli nuclear response. On the other hand, 
Iraq could reasonably have concluded that whatever it did to Kuwaiti citi- 
zens, or even to allied POW's, the allied forces were not likely to respond in 
kind. 
Given that allied reprisals were not likely-indeed, they are specifically 
prohibited by law27-the only possible deterrent was the threat of criminal 
prosecutions for war crimes. President Bush acknowledged this possibility 
before the conflict.28 Nothing, however, has come of it. The judicial traves- 
26. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. 
27. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signa- 
ture Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, T 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 146; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 
art. 33, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308. 
28. In October 1990, President Bush issued a public warning to Saddam Hussein that he could 
be held legally accountable for war crimes. DoD REPORT, supra note 25, at 634; Dan Balz, Presi- 
dent Warns Iraq of War Crimes Trials, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1990, at A19. 
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ties that occurred in Kuwait following the War undermined whatever possi- 
bility there was of war-crime trials. Any such action would have appeared 
as "victors' justice" rather than the enforcement of a rule of law applicable 
to all parties to the dispute. 
In contrast, it is probably fair to say that the United States and allied 
forces conducted their operations in accordance with international law.29 
Some have voiced objections that the allied bombing campaign violated the 
law of proportionality, but this standard is the weakest of all international 
law norms.30 
The concept of proportionality-which holds that responsive uses of 
force "must not exceed in manner or aim the necessity provoking them"31- 
invites endless argument. Arguably, the United States did nothing more 
than was necessary to defeat Iraq in a four-day ground war. Of course, that 
argument rests on the critical assumption that a four-day ground war was 
the appropriate response to Iraq's actions. Should the United States have 
been willing to exercise a great deal more patience, if that meant considera- 
bly less suffering for Iraqis? Should it have been willing to adopt methods of 
warfare that would have jeopardized the success of the enterprise or risked 
greater injury to allied troops? 
There can never be a convincing measure of proportionality as long as 
the two sides of the equation are incommensurable. In this instance, the 
sovereignty of a state was at issue. But sovereignty is not a relative value in 
the system of international aw. Rather, it is the foundation or starting point 
of the whole system. By the standards established by international law, the 
value of state sovereignty is incalculable. From this it follows that the idea 
of proportionality makes no sense whenever state sovereignty is at issue in a 
dispute.32 
More important, proportionality is impossible to measure as long as sov- 
ereign states place different values on the lives of their own citizens and 
those of the enemy state. Yet, if all life were valued equally, no one would 
ever go to war. War rests on an asymmetrical valuing of human life that 
runs directly counter to the logic of a rule of proportionality. 
How many American lives, then, should we be willing to lose in order to 
protect Iraqis? No one knows how to answer this question. The standard of 
proportionality, at best, points to a discretionary judgment that will be made 
differently by each side to the dispute. To be an effective legal standard, it 
would require application by a neutral adjudicator in which the power of 
discretion could be vested-just as when domestic courts are called upon to 
29. See, e.g., DoD REPORT, supra note 25, at 615, 617, 620-24, 626-27. 
30. See RAMSEY CLARK AND OTHERS, WAR CRIMES: A REPORT ON UNITED STATES WAR 
CRIMES AGAINST IRAQ 44, 53 (1992). 
31. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1637 
(1984). 
32. One clear example of this "incomensurability" is a policy of self-defense that relies upon 
the threat of a strategic nuclear response. Mutual assured destruction is a policy in which this 
incomensurability appears as the total disjunction between means and ends. 
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make determinations of "reasonableness" based on incommensurable values. 
Yet such adjudicators are precisely what the international system lacks. 
Nothing that occurred in the Gulf War should make us more hopeful about 
the future in this regard. 
In the absence of an independent adjudicator, each party must make its 
own judgments of legality. While some scholars have argued that interna- 
tional law works precisely through such decentralized decisionmaking,33 it is 
safe to say that the only judgment that will be recognized as legitimate is 
that the allies conducted their operations in accordance with international 
law while Iraq violated it. Yet, we must still ask what lesson other states are 
likely to draw from this proposition. Does the international law of warfare 
appear reasonable? Is it a system of law that is likely to gather increasing 
respect? Whose interests does it protect? 
The overwhelming lesson of the conduct of the Gulf War is that there is 
no direct correlation between complying with international legal rules and 
minimizing suffering. Even while the allies arguably complied with the legal 
norms, they inflicted massive suffering upon the Iraqi people. Estimates of 
Iraqi fatalities range up to 100,000 soldiers,34 as well as a significant number 
of civilians.35 Iraq's infrastructure was largely destroyed.36 In the year fol- 
lowing the War, Iraq's child mortality rate was reported to have tripled.37 
The international community continues to monitor possible outbreaks of dis- 
ease and hunger. How long it will take for Iraq to fully recover its position 
as a modern state is anybody's guess. 
The suffering permitted within the rules of international aw is stunning. 
International law's concern with proportionality runs only to the relation- 
ship between this suffering and the goal of reestablishing Kuwaiti sover- 
eignty. International law, as we have seen, has no way of balancing this 
equation. More important, it is not concerned with the disproportionality 
between the suffering on the Iraqi side and the minimal burden on the allied 
side. 
The West was enraged when a few allied pilots were paraded on Iraqi 
television. This was, it is true, a clear violation of international aw.38 Nev- 
ertheless, the lives of tens of thousands of Iraqis were being destroyed at the 
same time-wholly within the parameters of international aw. While inter- 
33. See, e.g., MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WILLIAM T. BURKE, FLOREN- 
TINO P. FELICIANO, RICHARD N. GARDNER, ASHER LANS, GERTRUDE C. K. LEIGHTON, LEON 
LIPSON, & NORBERT A. SCHLEIG, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 8-15 (1960). 
34. Anthony Cordesman, The Persian Gulf War: An Analysis, in THE WORLD ALMANAC AND 
BOOK OF FACTS 35, 37 (Mark S. Hoffman ed., 1992) (citing U.S. Intelligence estimates). 
35. Caryle Murphy, Iraqi Death Toll Remains Clouded; Baghdad Promises Figures, WASH. 
POST, June 23, 1991, at Al. 
36. Id. at 38; see also MIDDLE EAST WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS 
IN THE GULF WAR 171-93 (1991). 
37. See Don Shannon, U.S. Denies Blame for Malnutrition in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, 
at A4. 
38. See 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 27, 
art. 13, ? 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146 (protecting prisoners of war from "insults and 
public curiosity"). 
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national law condemns Iraq's seizure of the hostages, it virtually ignores the 
massive numbers of Iraqi civilians-let alone a largely conscript army-that 
suffered the effects of the Gulf War. 
International law in its present form shows more concern with anti- 
quated concepts of chivalry among combatants than with the moder reality 
of mass destruction. The rules of war do not adequately reflect the reality of 
warfare between a third-world country and a superpower. Compliance with 
the rules of war is a prescription for disaster. This lesson was learned a long 
time ago in places such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. To assert that massive 
aerial bombardment-with its inevitable civilian casualties-complies with 
the international aws of warfare, but that reciprocal efforts by a third-world 
country to put civilian populations at risk violate international law only 
reveals one's own political interests. One cannot take this position and realis- 
tically expect the international legal system to gain the respect of countries 
that are more likely to be the victims than the allies of great powers. 
The international law that governs the conduct of war is ultimately a 
system designed to protect the self-interests of the more powerful states. 
Rules that do not treat all lives equally cannot, in the long run, support an 
international legal system. The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
begin to address this imbalance;39 not surprisingly, the United States has 
refused to agree to such changes. 
In light of this imbalance, one of the oddest aspects of Iraqi behavior 
during the War was its action with respect to the foreign hostages whom it 
held during the first several months of the crisis. Holding the hostages was 
an obvious violation of international law, but was perversely rational. In 
contrast, Iraq's decision to release the hostages was puzzling. It is doubtful 
that the air campaign against Iraq would have taken the same form had 
foreign hostages remained at a number of military and industrial installa- 
tions. One lesson of this War, therefore, might be: Don't give up your 
hostages. 
III. THE WAR'S AFTERMATH 
Assuming that the allied effort was initiated and conducted within the 
norms of international law, we must still ask what international aw sought 
to achieve by mobilizing and approving this use of force. In one sense the 
answer is obvious: The goal was the reestablishment of the sovereign state of 
Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and a possessor of international 
legal rights. But why protect Kuwait? Kuwait, by anyone's standards, 
hardly embodied a just regime. Defending that regime did not mean protect- 
ing the human rights and self-determination of the Kuwaiti people. If that 
39. For example, Article 44 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I offers legal recognition to non- 
regular or guerilla forces and Article 1 extends the rule of international law into some areas of armed 
conflict that had previously been governed by domestic law or fallen within a state's jurisdiction. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, arts. 1, 44, 16 
I.L.M. 1391-92, 1396, 1410. 
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was not clear before the War, it has surely become clear in the War's 
aftermath.40 
Was the goal of the War nothing more than the substitution of one un- 
just regime for another? One regime was domestic and the other foreign, but 
was this goal worth so much sacrifice and destruction? How many lives 
were worth sacrificing for the ruling family of Kuwait? When we ask this 
question from the perspective of international law, we cannot simply mea- 
sure U.S. lives. Was Iraq's destruction worth the benefit to the international 
community of saving the Kuwaiti regime? Does the answer change if we 
define the goal as the saving of Kuwaiti sovereignty? Sovereignty is only a 
formal legal quality that may or may not-depending on the circum- 
stances-support a morally valuable goal. Regardless of how we define the 
value pursued, we must also determine the degree to which we are willing to 
hold the Iraqi population accountable for the actions of the Iraqi regime. 
The Iraqi people were not asked if they wanted to invade Kuwait. But 
surely they were held accountable. 
Of course, international aw only permitted-it did not compel-the use 
of force in the Gulf War. Nevertheless, international law legitimized the 
choice to go to war. Once the procedures and standards that allowed this 
choice were established, international law had no way of evaluating the 
choice when it was made. The character of the Kuwaiti regime simply 
dropped out of the equation; just as the suffering of the Iraqi people 
disappeared. 
The allies' response during the Gulf War presents more than a question 
of the end failing to justify the means. Rather, the problem goes to the very 
foundation of the system of international law, which is organized around an 
ideal of state sovereignty. Because of this, it can deal only partially and 
inadequately with the crucial elements of the state: the people and the gov- 
ernment. When these elements are in tension, as they often are, interna- 
tional law's concern with the state results in punishing the people for the 
actions of a government for which they cannot justly be held accountable. 
This was the problem of Iraq. 
The situation in Kuwait represents the opposite problem. There, the de- 
fense of the state became the defense of the interests of the existing regime, 
which diverged from the interests of the people. In short, all too often the 
people bear the burdens of international law, while the regime reaps the 
benefits. 
This pattern is not accidental. Although international law is a formal 
system that structures relations among states, it is created and maintained by 
governments. As long as the only voices heard within the system of interna- 
tional law are those of state governments, the system is not likely to be re- 
formed. Humanity itself-the people who suffer the injuries-must be 
brought into the system. Doing so, however, would directly contravene the 
40. See Caryle Murphy, Kuwait Reported Moving to Curb Rights Abuses, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 
1991, at A30. 
[Vol. 45:425 438 
LESSONS FROM THE GULF WAR 
self-interests of the state governments that create and maintain international 
law. 
The same confusion among states, peoples, and governments was evident 
in the international response to the internal uprisings in Iraq immediately 
following the War. Iraq surely did not take any lesson in legalism from its 
military defeat in Kuwait. Instead, it unleashed the same violent force it had 
used against Kuwait on its own minorities. Once again, Iraq tested the lim- 
its of modern international law, which for two generations has struggled to 
give some legal protection to human rights. 
Having expelled the Iraqis from Kuwait, international law-and the 
forces mobilized on its behalf-seemed to have nothing more to say. The 
allies' first response was to allow the Iraqis a free hand to brutally suppress 
segments of their own population. Instead of focusing on human suffering 
and political justice, allied discussion focused on technical distinctions be- 
tween aircraft and helicopters and on exactly what was said among the 
generals negotiating Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Justice and human 
rights seemed not to be the operative terms of international aw. The United 
States stood by and watched while Iraqi forces crushed dissident movements 
that the United States itself had encouraged. 
In fact, international aw became a barrier to effective action. Its protec- 
tion of the principle of state sovereignty made it more difficult for the United 
States to take action to protect the Kurds and Shiites in Iraq. While interna- 
tional law could legitimate an international mobilization to return an unjust 
Kuwaiti regime, it offered little support to the just aspirations of millions of 
Iraqis. 
In the end, of course, the United States intervened on behalf of the 
Kurds-but not the Shiites.41 And the limited humanitarian assistance that 
did arise resulted from domestic political pressure, created largely by ample 
press coverage, not from international law. It makes no sense, however, to 
say that the United States could intervene in Iraq to help the Kurds return 
to their homes, but could not intervene to defend them in their villages and 
homes before they became refugees. The War's aftermath has shown that 
international law can be a stumbling block for rational policy decisions. 
As we have witnessed in Eastern Europe, international crises will be in- 
creasingly driven by movements for self-determination among nationalist 
groups. The United States' misguided policy in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War, and the failure of the United Nations to take effective action, mean that 
for large segments of the world's population international aw is likely to be 
a problem rather than a solution. 
International law has existed far too long as a system devoted to the 
maintenance of the status quo. This has meant, first, the maintenance of 
state boundaries and, second, the maintenance of the existing regimes within 
41. Intervention to protect the Shiites had to wait for more than a year. The timing of this 
intervention in late August of 1992 seems to have been related more to domestic politics than to a 
concern for human rights. 
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those boundaries. If international law is to aid in the foundation of a new 
world order, it cannot simply carry forward these same two ends. It must 
focus instead on change and on securing just relations among peoples and 
their governments, rather than on maintaining the inviolability of state 
sovereignty. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, the Gulf War provides a lesson in the failures of international 
law, even as it suggests the possibilities for a more successful future. While 
the failures of international law typify its troubled state in the modern era, 
the significance of the allies' response is cast in some doubt by the excep- 
tional circumstances that made it possible. 
What would change this situation and revitalize international law to 
match the possibilities revealed by the War? First, human rights must be 
established as the foundation of international aw. None of the actions taken 
specifically in the name of international law had as their end the direct sup- 
port of human rights. Indeed, the War was largely a disaster for human 
rights, not just in Iraq, but in surrounding countries as well. For human 
rights to be the end, however, state sovereignty must be displaced as the 
central value of the international legal system. Focus on the state must give 
way to closer differentiation between interests of peoples and governments. 
This, in turn, cannot be achieved without reestablishing the connection be- 
tween international law and war crimes, a connection that was born in, and 
died at, Nuremberg.42 
Surprisingly, there has been little discussion of prosecuting the Iraqi 
leadership for war crimes. Instead, the international community has allowed 
Saddam Hussein to hold the Iraqi people hostage. The penalties directed at 
his regime place their costs on the people. The Iraqi people continue to 
suffer, instead of those responsible for the illegal actions. International law 
will not be taken seriously as a constraint on government policy as long as 
illegal behavior is divorced from personal consequences. Only criminal pros- 
ecutions can effectively separate international law from the self-interests of 
state governments. 
Second, state sovereignty must yield not only to an ideal of human rights 
but also to an understanding of global interdependence. For example, there 
has been a striking failure of international aw to recognize the environmen- 
tal consequences of the Gulf War. Iraq's actions with respect to the oil wells 
and the waters of the Gulf caused a major environmental disaster. While 
some provision for compensating for these damages and other costs is envi- 
sioned if and when Iraq chooses to sell oil again, on the whole we have had 
silence on this issue. International law remains more concerned with nine- 
teenth century ideas of state sovereignty than with contemporary under- 
42. See generally Paul W. Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in 
Nicaragua v. United States and The Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1987) 
(critiquing the development of international law since Nuremburg). 
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standings of the fragile character of all our lives on this planet. This too 
must be corrected if international aw is to speak realistically and effectively 
in a new world order. 
If the new world order does nothing more than add a few more states to 
the existing system of state sovereignty, it will soon resemble the old order. 
We have little reason to expect the next generation of political leadership to 
be more successful at maintaining respect for state sovereignty than was the 
last generation. More important, we do not yet have a good reason to re- 
spect such a rule, or a legal system founded on it. We will not have such a 
reason until there is a better match between the demands of justice and 
human rights on the one hand and state sovereignty on the other. At pres- 
ent, these goals often point in opposite directions. 
